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NIE-40 (Economic)

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NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

November 26, 1951

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- (a) Repair both naval and merchant vessels.
- (b) Construction of minor combatants.
- (c) Construction and conversion of merchant vessels.

It is not believed that materials and manpower will be a primary difficulty in the picture of naval construction as presented in the attached table (Section III). The estimated construction is considerably below maximum shippard capacity. It is assumed that the necessary materials to complete Western European naval programs will have been already ear-marked by mid-1952. The Soviet Union and her Satellites are believed able to maintain their present trend of construction indefinitely. The materials for the expected increase in Soviet construction can be obtained in Western Germany, if that is necessary. A conservative estimate of Germany's effort in submarines alone during 1944 is around 300,000 tons.

2. Consumption

Naval vessels are not "consumed" at a rate sufficient to warrant comment. The utilization of materials for naval construction may be expected to have an impact on the rost of the exonomy; the extent of this impact can not be judged.

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ESTIMATED CONSTRUCTION, CONSTRUCTION CAPACITY, AND INVENTORY SOVIET BLOC AND WESTERN EUROPE

Appro Nav	NOTE	Tue slavia 6,286	Mc Cermany Was Ot, 02	Sweeter Ar Oro			No. 1984 22,875	ads		10,72		a		Sel £ium 5,070	₩.	ROUTE THE THE	ct Chino	2	B waria 1.460	•		. East N		USS R 812.950	8-6	1951	1.Invent.
Naval Tonnage: Standard Displacement Merchant Tonnage: Gross Registered Tons		None	None	None		None	None	17 1	0 1,300	None	1,000	None	None	None	Mone	0 20	MONO MONO	None	None	None		None	None	107.780		of comp	2.Est.Cons
lard Displacement		3,800 3,000		8	13,780 4,400			30,000 None			25,000 None		None None		None None	None None			None None	2	None None			181 590 76 590		a.(tr. 1951 3.Est.Constr.
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Following Not Included As Having No Construction And No Capacity: Czechoslavakia Luxembourg West Berlin North Korea Saar Inner Mongolia Switzerland		350,000 110,000	None None No	350,000 140,000	150,000 60,000	20,000 8,000	151,000 62,000 1	300,000,000	000 000 000 000 Mg	None None M	700 000 160 000	2000 10.000	220-000 88:000	000 30:000	1,500 600	11,000 4,000	2,000 800	12,000 4,000	18,100 7,000	10,000 4,000	160,000 64,000	22,000 22,000	None 315,000			Mer. Nav.	8.Est.Const. Cap.Mid-1952
Appro		None None I			000		None None 0		5	None None 2	200			None None D			None None O	None None 2	None None A	None None 01	None None 20	None None	500	02	8-6		9 Est. Const. 10 Est. Con.

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2. The figures given in the attached table represent the following:

- (a) Tonnage for naval inventory is in metric tons; all units at standard displacement.
- (b) Major types include all units down through and including minesweepers (AM).
- (c) Figures given under 2a, 3a, 9a and 10a cannot be considered a production rate but represent tonnage which has been completed during period indicated (i.e. 2a equals tonnage completed during entire twelve months of 1951; 3a equals only tonnage completed during first six months of 1952, etc.)
- (d) Figures given in 1 and 5 represent only completed tonnage and do not include tonnage under construction.
- (e) Figures given in 2b, 3b, 9b and 10b represent final weight where completed, and not actual weight of material on the ways.
- (f) In some cases, increases or decreases in inventory represent either MDAP transfers or scrapping.
- (g) Construction capacity given in 7 and 8 represents the total tonnage that can be building at any given time, and does not represent the possible yearly construction, which may differ, depending upon construction methods and types under construction.
- (h) Since most shipbuilding facilities can be utilized for either naval or merchant vessels, the figures given in 7 and 8 represent a comparison of naval and merchant construction, assuming that manhours spent on merchant and naval construction would be proportional with the weight of material handled for each type of construction, excepting certain countries which have no naval construction experience at all, and other countries which are not engaged in merchant construction.

General Note
Production rates can not properly apply to the navel construction outlined in this summary, and are not given in the attached table. The column headings were changed so that they more accurately describe the meaning of the figures below. The word construction was substituted for production, as it is a more accurate description of the building process of a ship.

3. Construction World War II

Rundown on Type of Naval Construction undertaken in Western Europe during World War II.

(a) By countries:

(1) POLAND:

no activity - as country was continuously occupied by the enemy and employed primarily as a staging and rear support area for most of the war. DANZIG considered "German" during the war. GDYNIA served solely as a German naval operating base under the name of GOTENHAFEN.

(2) CZECHOSLOVAKIA:

no known activity - may have built/repaired/ converted craft for the Axis River flotillas. CONFIDENTIAL CONTROL (3) GERMANY_RAST.

conventional submarine construction at: Nostock, Stettin and Danzig. Type XXI fast SS assembly at Danzig. M.40 minesweeper construction at nostock and Koenigsberg. "Schicau" types of DD and DC at Elbing. M.43 minesweeper assembly at Rostock and Koenigsberg. Considerable construction and conversion of coastal types.

HUNGARY: (4)

same as for Czechoslovakia.

ROMANIA: (5)

probably utilized by the Germans for assembly type construction of landing and coastal types in Black Sea; some conversion work, and completion during war of at least 2 SS and 1 CMC.

BULGARIA:

no known activity.

ALBANIA: (7)

NIL.

COMMUNIST CHINA:

as then Nationalist China: NIL. Japanese used some facilities to support their

occupation naval forces.

NORTH KOREA:

as part of Japan, not known, but probably not great.

INNER MONGOLIA: (10)

NIL.

AUSTRIA: (11)

same as for Czechoslovakia.

(12)BELGIUM: Coastal warfare types for occupying Germans, probably not exceeding .inC and PCE types in importance. 1,640 ton DE ARTEVELDE completed in Holland by the Germans.

(13)DENMARK: Normal pre-war program delayed by the occupation; some replacement DC (materials furnished by Germans in return for certain pre-war DC commandeered by them) begun (not completed) during war. Germans did not exploit Danish facilities for naval construction.

(14) FINLAND:

1 CMC completed, as well as a few PT. No known work for German 'allies'; probably no activity following 'liberation' by the Soviets.

(15) FRANCE:

Normal work on pre-war naval program down to the defeat of Metropolitan France in mid-1940; complete cessation thereof for the duration, Germans made minimal use of French shipyard facilities and did not use them for construction/conversion of types above coastal patrol categories.

(16) GREECE:

Assembly work on 2 DD ceased with the German invasion in 1941. Germans used local facilities for conversion of local small craft.

(17) <u>IT.LY</u>:

Down to the invasion of Italy and the overthrow of the Mussolini regime (1942-43) continued work on fleet-type naval program, with gradually shifting emphasis from BB and cruisers to CV conversions and DD and smaller craft. Germans limited their exploitation of new construction to PT, landing and coastal patrol types, and refit/ conversion of ODD's and under

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CONFIDENT PRoved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79R010194001200010028-6 NIL. (18)LUXEMBURG:

> Normal work on pre-war naval program until NETHERLANDS: (19)the German 1940 invasion. Germans limited

use of yards to AMC, PCE and lesser types, although a limited number of DD built to Dutch design were begun toward the end of

the war.

Normal work on pre-war program until the German 1940 invasion. Germans had little (20) NORWAY:

success in exploiting yards even for coastal type construction due to strong passive resistance (sabotage by scuttling of a newly

completed ex-Norwegian DD).

No construction of significance due to lack PORTUGAL: (21)

of resources.

Naval construction virtually at a standstill (22) SPAIN:

due to exhaustion by civil war and lack of imports. ambitious program announced toward end of war remained largely a "paper program" for these reasons.

Considerable upswing in naval construction (23) <u>SWEDEN</u>:

due to country's determination to preserve neutrality. Non-involvement preserved yards; shortage of materials resulting from reduced imports overcome by intelligent exploitation of domestic resources. built included CLAA (completed after war),

DD, DC, SS, AM, PT and coastal warfare

types.

(24) SWITZERLAND: NIL.

Aside from assembly of a few vessels from (25)TURKEY:

previously imported components, no

significant activity.

as heart of the 3rd Reich (26) WEST GETWANY:

> big ship construction suspended, except for the completion of 2 BB, 1 CA begun before the war; a moderate effort in DD, DC types; an optimum effort in submarines; a large scale effort in AM, AMC, PT and other coastal warfare types; and conversion of all types of mercantile categories. The Bremen and Hamburg yard complexes were supported

by yards in Kiel, Enden and Lübeck.

WEST BERLIN: NIL. (27)

the small pre-war program, consisting YUGOSLAVIA: (28)

largely of assembly of DD and smaller types from imported components, was halted by the German 1941 invasion. Axis made only limited use of facilities, for assembly of standardized amphibious and coastal craft.

(b) SUMMARY

While in control of most of Europe, Germany failed to exploit to the utmost existing shippard production potential in occupied countries for the construction of large, medium or even smaller regular combatant type vessels. The bulk of regular combatant tonnage completed for the German Navy was carried out in yards within the confines of Germany proper.

The reasons for this phenomenon are probably varied, but lack of materials was probably not the criterion.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION SECTION NIE-40

BB Battleship
BM Monitor
Ca
GL Light Cruiser
CLaa Light Cruiser, anti-aircraft
DD Destroyer
DC Coastal Destroyer
DE Ocean Escort
SS Submarine
PG Gunboat
PF Frigate
PCE Escort
PC Submarine Chaser
AM Minesweeper
AMC Coastal Minesweeper
CMC Coastal Minelayer
10! before any of the above designations equals old unit.